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Conceptually, focusing on slavery writ large – or better: 
human exploitation – in three distinct eras provides one 
with a better understanding of the manner in which the 
overall legal regime has evolved internationally and the 
way in which the introduction of the term of art “slavery-
like practice” has obfuscated the law. This term, introduced 
in 1966 as a means of viscerally denouncing apartheid, 
quickly became synonymous, within the United Nations 
human rights system, with social evils as diverse as incest 
and female genital mutilation. “Slavery-like practice” 
muddied the waters as its use confused the political with 
the legal not only where “slavery” as defined by the 1926 
Slavery Convention was concerned, but more so with 
the nomenclature of “practices similar to slavery”, those 
conventional servitudes noted in the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention. In so doing, the use of the term “slavery-
like practice” effectively grinded to a halt any evolution 
which might have transpired with regard to the law of 
human exploitation. It was only at the start of the twenty-
first century, with the enumeration of types of exploitation 
within the trafficking conventions and the coming into 
force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court which criminalised enslavement, that the law of 
human exploitation emerged from the shadows of the 
term “slavery-like practice” to become relevant once more.
This study considers the three eras of the abolition of 
slavery and human exploitation: i) 1890-1966 – the slave 
trade, slavery, and servitude in general international law; 
ii) 1966-1998 – “slavery-like practices” and human rights 
law; and iii) 1998-present – enslavement and international 
criminal law. More so, the study focuses on the second 
era, from 1966 to 1998, to demonstrate how the United 
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Nations turned from dealing with issues of slavery and 
human exploitation within a legal paradigm to ridding 
its legal content and equating the notion of “slavery-like 
practice” with any perceived social evil which the United 
Nations’ Charter-based system sought to address. The era 
of “slavery-like practices”, which is now behind us and 
should be consigned to the dustbin of history, obfuscated 
international law and demonstrated a fundamental weak-
ness of the United Nations human rights system which, 
within the multilateral, Charter-based system, is at its very 
core political. It is only with the recent criminalisation 
of slavery and human exploitation at the international 
level – manifest in the trafficking conventions and the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court – where it 
bumps up against the countervailing right of accused to 
know the charges against them that the law related to 
slavery and human exploitation re-emerges as a viable 
instrument for holding perpetrators accountable and by 
extension seeking to protecting individuals from nefarious 
exploitation.
I. 1890-1966 – General International Law
A. The Slave Trade
The move to address slavery and human exploitation at the 
international level was first given voice by a declaration at 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Settling the Napoleonic 
Wars, the European Powers expressed their wish to “bring 
to an end a scourge which has for a long time desolated 
Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity”. In so 
doing, they declared that they:
[…] consider the universal abolition of the trade in Negroes 
to be particularly worthy of their attention, being in confor-
mity with the spirit of the times, and the general principles 
of our august Sovereigns, who are animated in their sincere 
desire to work towards the quickest and most effective of 
measures, by all means at their disposal, and to act, in the 
use of those means with all zealousness and perseverance 
which is required of such a grand and beautiful cause 1.
Despite attempts throughout the era of the Concert of 
Europe to get agreement on a legal text outlawing the slave 
trade at sea, this was not to be, as a number of maritime 
powers hesitated in the wake of British dominance of the 
seas and its zealousness in seeking to outlaw the slave 
trade by establishing a right to visit ships at sea at variance 
with established law as rooted in the Grotian notion of 
the freedom of the seas 2.
As a result, the United Kingdom turned to building a 
bilateral network of treaties to suppress the slave trade at 
sea which ultimately consisted of thirty-one States 3. In the 
main, these treaties provided for a mutual right to visit the 
other flag State’s ships on suspicion of involvement in the 
slave trade, and to the forfeiture by specifically constituted 
bilateral courts – so-called mixed commissions – of any 
vessel found to be shipping slaves or having onboard 
equipment specific to the carrying of slaves 4. It has been 
estimated that the various mixed commissions situated 
on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean were “responsible 
for the condemnation of over 620 slave vessels and the 
liberation of nearly 80,000 slaves” 5. By the mid-1860s, 
the United Kingdom achieved bilaterally what it failed to 
procure multilaterally: the legal abolition of the slave trade 
at sea. Universal abolition was given formal recognition 
by the 1890 General Act of the Brussels Conference which 
established a maritime zone off the East Coast of Africa 
wherein European States were granted a limited right to 
visit so as to suppress the slave trade where it continued 
to persist 6.
Susan Miers notes that the Brussels Conference 
“focused attention on the slavery issue and helped to 
rally support to the imperialist cause”, which was mani-
fest in the scramble by European Powers to appropriate 
territory on the Africa continent 7. With this came the 
move to abolish the slave trade on land and the gradual 
suppression of the slave trade in Africa. As a result of 
the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles seeing 
1. Declaration des 8 Cours, relative à l’abolition universelle de la traite des nègres, 8 February 1815, in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 3 (1815-1816), 
London, James Ridgway, 1838, p. 972. The eight Powers were Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
2. See J. Allain, “Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade”, British Yearbook of International Law 2007, 
vol. 78, 2008, p. 342-388.
3. These thirty-one States included, in chronological order of signature: Portugal, Denmark, France, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Buenos Aires, 
Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Confederation of Peru, Bolivia, Hanseatic Cities, Tuscany, the two Sicilies, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, Haiti, Texas, 
Austria, Prussia, Russia, The United States of America, Equator, Muscat, Arabs of the Gulf, New Granada, Zanzibar, Egypt. See R. Phillimore, 
Commentaries upon International Law, London, Butterworths, 1879, p. 420-421.
4. Such equipment included open gratings on hatches, spare planks for the creation of a slave-deck, possession of shackles or an overabundance 
of water and food for needs of the crew on the planned voyage. For an example of an “equipment clause”, see Further Additional Article to the 
Treaty of 1822 between Great Britain and The Netherlands, for the Prevention of the Traffic in Slaves, 25 January 1823, in British and Foreign State 
Papers, vol. 10 (1822-1823), London, James Ridgway, 1850, p. 559. For reference to mixed commissions, see L. Bethell, “The Mixed Commissions 
for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century”, Journal of African History, vol. 7, 1966, p. 87.
5. J.-P. van Niekerk, “British, Portuguese, and American judges in Adderley Street; the International Legal Background to, and some Judicial Aspects 
of, the Cape Town Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Part 2)”, The Comparative 
and International Journal of Southern Africa, vol. 37(2), 2004, p. 200.
6. See General Act of the Brussels Conference relative to the African Slave Trade, 2 July 1890, in Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 
London, Cass, 1967, vol. 2, p. 499.
7. S. Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1975, p. 294. For the “Scramble for Africa”, see 
H. Wesseling, Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880-1914, Westport, Praeger, 1996.
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Germany lose its African colonies, Belgium, France and 
the United Kingdom sought the abrogation of the 1890 
General Act which, beyond the suppression of the slave 
trade, allowed for commercial access to Africa for all. By 
way of a treaty signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1919, 
the colonial powers effectively reduced the 65 articles of 
the General Act to the following provision:
The Signatory Powers exercising sovereign rights or author-
ity in African territories will continue to watch over the 
preservation of the native populations and to supervise the 
improvement of the conditions of their moral and material 
well-being. They will, in particular, endeavour to secure 
the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of 
the slave trade by land and sea 8.
As the provision indicates, by the early part of the 
twentieth-century, State focus had also come to include 
slavery.
B. Slavery
The issue of slavery was first considered by the League of 
Nations in 1922, when a general resolution was passed by 
the Assembly which “was intended to disarm suspicions 
that it was an attack” on Ethiopia, a non-member State 
of the League which had successfully fought off the Ital-
ian colonialism at Adwa in 1893 9. With the admission 
of Ethiopia to the League of Nations the following year, 
focus of League turned to the promotion of an interna-
tional legal instrument meant to suppress both slavery 
and the slave trade. In 1924, the Council of the League of 
Nations created the Temporary Slavery Commission, a 
body of experts whose work constitutes the intellectual 
DNA of much of what is found not only in the Slavery 
Convention negotiated and established in 1926, but also 
the 1956 Supplementary Convention established by the 
United Nations.
While the signatories to the Saint-Germain-en-Laye 
Convention had endeavoured to “secure the complete 
suppression of slavery […] and of the slave trade”, the 
States negotiating the 1926 Slavery Convention were not 
willing to go so far where slavery was concerned. By way 
of Article 2 of the 1926 Slavery Convention, States Parties 
agreed to “suppress and prevent the slave trade”, but did 
not seek to give immediate effect to like obligations with 
regard to slavery, as they pledged to “bring about, progres-
sively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of 
slavery in all its forms” 10. The Convention, recognising that 
forced labour could develop into conditions analogous 
to slavery, allowed it to persist for public purposes but 
sought, though “progressively and as soon as possible”, to 
put an end to the practice. While States Parties committed 
to undertaking negotiations with the look to once more 
establishing a general treaty to suppress the slave trade at 
sea, this provision was still-born as no such instrument 
ever materialised. Where the slave trade was concerned, 
however, the States Parties undertook, at Article 3, to:
[…] adopt all appropriate measures with a view to prevent-
ing and suppressing the embarkation, disembarkation and 
transport of slaves in their territorial waters and upon all 
vessels flying their respective flags.
While it can be said that, lex pasterior legi priori 
derogate, the obligation flowing from the 1926 Slavery 
Convention have been superseded by provisions of con-
temporary international human rights law, what remains 
are the normative definitions of slavery and the slave trade 
as set out in Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention:
1. Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom 
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
are exercised.
2. The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, 
acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce 
him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a 
slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts 
of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with 
a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every 
act of trade or transport in slaves.
As was noted in the Judgment of the Trial Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in the 2002 Kunarac et als. case:
The customary international law status of these substantive 
provisions is evinced by the almost universal acceptance 
of that Convention and the central role that the definition 
of slavery in particular has come to play in subsequent 
international law developments in this field 11.
While the definition of the slave trade has remained 
uncontested, the definition of “slavery” has been inter-
preted in at least three ways. The European Court of 
Human Rights, in its 2005 Siliadin judgment, considered 
the definition of slavery in very narrow terms, as applying 
exclusively in situations of chattel slavery, where a person 
has de jure ownership over another 12. The Court states:
8. Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin, 26 February 1885, and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, 2 July 1890, 10 September 1919, 
Article 11, § 1.
9. S. Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem, Walnut Creek, AltaMira Press, 2003, p. 73. See also J. Allain, “Slavery 
and the League of Nations: Ethiopia as a Civilised Nation”, Journal of the History of International Law, vol. 8, 2006, p. 213-244.
10. League of Nations, Slavery Convention, Geneva, 25 September 1926, Doc. C.586.M.223.1926.VI, Publications of the League of Nations, 16 October 
1926, VI.B. Slavery. 1926.VI.B.7, Article 2; as reproduced in J. Allain, The Slavery Conventions: The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1926 League of 
Nations Convention and the 1956 United Nations Convention, Leiden – Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 754.
11. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case nº IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 
12 June 2002, § 520.
12. See European Court of Human Rights, Siliadin v. France, Application 73316/01, 26 July 2005, p. 37.
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[…] this definition corresponds to the “classic” meaning 
of slavery as it was practiced for centuries. Although the 
applicant was, in the instant case, clearly deprived of her 
personal autonomy, the evidence does not suggest that she 
was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other words that 
Mr and Mrs B. exercised a genuine right of legal ownership 
over her, thus reducing her to the status of an “object”.
The second interpretation of the term “slavery”, as set 
out in the 1926 Slavery Convention, was put forward by 
David Weissbrodt, then Member of the United Nations 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, in conjunction with Anti-Slavery Inter-
national. In their 2000 Report on Contemporary Forms 
of Slavery the authors content that slavery as defined in 
the 1926 Slavery Convention goes beyond the written 
word to also include lesser servitude mentioned by the 
1924 Temporary Slavery Commission:
By referring to “any or all of the powers of ownership” 
in its definition of slavery, and setting forth as its stated 
purpose the “abolition of slavery in all its forms” the Slavery 
Convention covered not only domestic slavery but also the 
other forms of slavery listed in the Report of the Temporary 
Slavery Commission 13.
This interpretation, however, cannot be sustained. 
It is clear that States, in negotiating the content of the 
1926 Convention, did not intend to widen the scope of 
“slavery” by subsuming within the definition lesser servi-
tudes which did not meet the threshold of the “status or 
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”. The 
travaux préparatoires bear this out, as the Union of South 
Africa, in commenting on the 1925 League of Nations Draft 
Convention, noted that the “Convention as drafted goes 
somewhat further than seems necessary for the abolition 
of slavery and the slave trade”. Where an early draft of the 
Convention introduced the concept of “domestic slavery 
and similar conditions” beside slavery, the Union of South 
Africa protested saying that either a person was a slave 
as defined by the proposed Convention or they were not:
If, […], they have become domestic slaves or persons in 
similar conditions in the manner indicated, that can only 
be because others have acquired a right of property in 
them, and they are therefore slaves as defined in Article 1 14.
When the 1926 Slavery Convention was presented to 
the Assembly of the League of Nations for signature, the 
Report which accompanies it recognised, though hesi-
tantly, that “these last practices do not come under the 
definition of slavery as it is given in Article 1” 15. As a result, 
the provision “domestic slavery and similar conditions” 
had been deleted from the final provisions of the 1926 
Slavery Convention.
The third interpretation of the definition of slavery 16 
flows from the travaux préparatoires, and has been 
expressed in part by the High Court of Australia in the 
2008 The Queen v Tang case wherein it was determined 
that the definition applies to both de jure and de facto 
slavery 17. The High Court looked to the wording to the first 
element of the definition of slavery – the phrase “status 
or condition” – to make the de jure / de facto distinction: 
status, it noted, “is a legal concept”, while “the evident 
purpose of the reference to ‘condition’ was to cover slavery 
de facto […]” 18. The High Court then made clear that the 
definition, unlike the European Court of Human Rights’ 
interpretation, did not turn on the “exercised a genuine 
right of legal ownership”, but instead that the “definition 
turns upon the exercise of power over a person”; and that 
in de facto conditions the “definition was addressing the 
exercise over a person of powers of the kind that attached 
to the right of ownership when the legal status was pos-
sible” 19. In other words, one could conceive of a de jure 
right of ownership over a person, but also the exercise of 
the powers which would otherwise be attached to a right 
of ownership in situations of de facto slavery.
In giving content to the scope of the definition of 
slavery, the High Court makes reference to a 1953 Report, 
in which the United Nations Secretary-General provides 
a reading of “powers attaching to the right of ownership”. 
The Secretary-General puts forward the following charac-
teristics of such powers attaching to the right of ownership: 
the ability to purchase or transfer a person; the absolute use 
of a person, their labour or the ownership of the product of 
that labour; as well as the indeterminacy or the inheritability 
of the status or condition of a person held in slavery 20.
13. See UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Updated Review of the Implementa-
tion of and Follow-up to the Conventions on Slavery, working paper prepared by D. Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2000/3, 26 May 2000, p. 5. Emphasis in the original.
14. League of Nations, Draft Convention on Slavery, Replies of Governments, Reply from the Government of the Union of South Africa, Doc. A.10(a).1926.
VI, 22 July 1926, Publications of the League of Nations, VI.B. Slavery. 1926.VI.B.3, p. 5.
15. League of Nations, Slavery Convention: Report presented to the Assembly by the Sixth Committee, Doc. A.104.1926.VI, 24 September 1926, 
Publications of the League of Nations, VI.B. Slavery. 1926.VI.B.5, p. 1-2.
16. See J. Allain, “The Definition of Slavery in International Law”, Howard Law Journal, vol. 52, 2009, p. 239-275.
17. See The Queen v Tang [2008], HCA 39, 28 August 2008; see also J. Allain, “The Queen v. Tang: Clarifying the Definition of ‘Slavery’ in International 
Law”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 2009, p. 246-257.
18. The Queen v Tang [2008], HCA 39, 28 August 2008, p. 12.
19. Ibid.
20. UN Economic and Social Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Other Forms of Servitude, UN Doc. E/2357, 
27 January 1953, p. 28, n. 1. As noted in this report the six powers attaching to the right of ownership read: “1. the individual of servile status 
may be made the object of a purchase; 2. the master may use the individual of servile status, and in particular his capacity to work, in an 
absolute manner, without any restriction other than that which might be expressly provided by law; 3. the products of labour of the individual 
of servile status become the property of the master without any compensation commensurate to the value of the labour; 4. the ownership of the 
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C. Servitude
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which notes 
at Article 4 that “No one shall be held in slavery or servi-
tude” 21. One year later, the General Assembly requested 
that the Economic and Social Council consider the issue of 
slavery and, by 1953, requested the UN Secretary-General 
canvas all States, both members and non-members of the 
United Nations, “concerning the desirability of a supple-
mentary convention and its possible contents” 22. Within 
this process, the United Kingdom put forward a Draft 
Supplementary Convention on Slavery and Servitude as 
a basis of negotiation. That title of the Convention would 
give way by the time it was accepted by the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1956 so as to read: the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 23. This 
shift from considering issues of “servitude” to issues of 
“institutions and practices similar to slavery” was one 
brought on by the unwillingness by States negotiating the 
Convention to accept immediate obligations to suppress 
servitude. Instead, the States Parties negotiating the 1956 
Supplementary Convention agreed, like in 1926, that they 
would “take all practicable and necessary legislative and 
other measures to bring about progressively and as soon 
as possible the complete abolition or abandonment” of 
these institutions and practices 24.
Despite this, throughout the whole negotiation process 
and stretching back as far as the 1924 Temporary Slavery 
Commission, the four institutions and practices enumer-
ated in Article 1 were considered “servitudes”. These four 
conventional servitudes, re-branded as “institutions or 
practices similar to slavery” are defined in Article 1 in the 
following terms:
(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition 
arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services 
or of those of a person under his control as security for a 
debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed 
is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the 
length and nature of those services are not respectively 
limited and defined;
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant 
who is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and 
labour on land belonging to another person and to render 
some determinate service to such other person, whether 
for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or 
given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money 
or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other 
person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the 
right to transfer her to another person for value received 
or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be 
inherited by another person;
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young 
person under the age of 18 years is delivered by either or 
both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another 
person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the 
exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.
The four institutions and practices similar to slavery 
are in essence (ie: normatively) conventional servitudes. 
If one considers the evolution of international human 
rights law which established, under Article 8(2) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that: 
“No one shall be held in servitude”; it can be argued that 
nomenclature of “institutions and practices similar to 
slavery” can be dropped in favour of recognising these as 
types of servitudes. To maintain that the obligation of the 
1956 Supplementary Convention to move “progressively 
and as soon as possible” towards “the complete abolition 
or abandonment” of the four institutions and practices 
similar to slavery some fifty years after the coming into 
existence of the 1956 Supplementary Convention and the 
evolution of human rights law seems dubious at best; and 
thus, the original understanding of these practices as types 
of servitude should revert to kind 25.
Beyond the nature of these four institutions and 
practices similar to slavery, it should be noted that the 
1956 Supplementary Convention creates for States Par-
ties specific obligations, of which the criminalisation of 
dependency on slavery or attempt to, accessory to, con-
spiracy to enslave or to participate in the slave trade; with 
such criminalisation for institutions or practices similar to 
slavery required to take place progressively and as soon as 
possible. Where servile marriage was concerned, Article 2 
requires that States Parties “undertake to prescribe, where 
appropriate, a suitable minimum age of marriage” and to 
set out State control over the institutions. Further provi-
sions are also found within the Convention regarding 
the slave trade, wherein States Parties are required to 
suppress the conveying of slaves by via ports, the coast 
or via airfields. While these obligations remain live for 
States Parties, it may be said that, like the 1926 Slavery 
individual of servile status can be transferred to another person; 5. the servile status is permanent, that is to say, it cannot be terminated by the 
will of the individual subject to it; 6. the servile status is transmitted ipso facto to descendants of the individual having such status”. See J. Allain, 
“The Definition of Slavery in International Law”, p. 262-266.
21. UN General Assembly, Resolution 217 A (III), 10 December 1948.
22. See UN General Assembly, Resolution 278 (III), 13 May 1949; and United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Resolution 475 (XV), 27 April 1953.
23. United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery, Final Act and Supplementary Convention, UN Doc. E/CONF.24/23, 4 September 1956.
24. Ibid., Article 1.
25. See J. Allain, “On the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General International Law”, Journal of the History of International Law, 
vol. 11, 2009, p. 303-332.
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Convention, the most relevant product of the 1956 Sup-
plementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery is its definitions.
II. 1966-1998 – Human Rights Law  
and “Slavery-like Practices”
In the aftermath of the negotiation of the 1956 Supple-
mentary Convention, monumental changes took place in 
international relations. For the first ten years of existence 
of the United Nations, membership was limited by the 
inability, within the context of the Cold War, of the Soviet 
Union and the United States of America to agree on a 
formula which would allow States, beyond the declared 
allies of the victors of the Second World War, to accede to 
the Organisation. In 1955, the log-jam of potential members 
was resolved, and membership in the United Nations 
has grown from its original forty-nine to its current one 
hundred and ninety-two member States. The bulk of the 
new membership resulted from the decolonisation process 
which ultimately shifted the balance of power from the 
North to the South within the democratic bodies of the 
United Nations. This was very much in evidence, where 
the issue of slavery and human exploitation was concerned, 
as the legal regime just considered – manifest in the 1926 
Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary Conven-
tion – would take a backseat for nearly half a century to 
the political concept of “slavery-like practices”. By turning 
to “slavery-like practices”, newly-independent States were 
given a platform to criticise colonialism, but more so, as a 
further means of challenging apartheid; while deflecting 
attention away from “entrenched customs”, such as child 
marriage and widow inheritance which, as Suzanne Miers 
writes, “they did not consider forms of servitude” 26.
A. The Slavery-like Practice of Apartheid
In the direct aftermath of the establishment of the 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery, no sense of urgency existed within the United 
Nations to address issues of human exploitation writ 
large. On an annual basis from 1960 to 1962, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council did little more than 
pass resolutions urging States to adhere to the 1926 and 
1956 Conventions 27. But by 1963, the Council considered 
that “there exists a need for accurate, comprehensive 
and up-to-date information of the extent of slavery, 
the slave trade and institutions and practices similar 
to slavery still persist today”. As such, it requested the 
UN Secretary-General to appoint a special rapporteur 28, 
who would bring up to date a study which had been car-
ried out in 1955 by Hans Engen on the extent to which 
slavery, the slave trade and servitude persisted 29. The 
new Special Rapporteur on Slavery, Mohamed Awad, 
presented his Report in 1966. In that Report, the link 
between slavery and apartheid was made for the first time 
as a result of a submission by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (Soviet Union) wherein it considered the lack 
of adherence to the 1956 Supplementary Convention 
as being “abnormal”; and stated that the “main factors 
upholding and encouraging slavery at the present time 
are colonialism, apartheid and racism” 30. This wording 
was reproduced by Awad in the section of his Report 
related to “suggestions for possible action by the United 
Nations in the field of slavery” 31.
During consideration of Mohamed Awad’s Report 
on Slavery, the Social Committee of the UN Economic 
and Social Council was drawn to the section dealing with 
suggestions for possible UN action. It was during these 
– rather contentious – deliberations that the term of art 
“slavery-like practice” emerged as the focal point of the 
drafting of a resolution which would later be forwarded 
to the Economic and Social Council and later still, on 
26 July 1966, pass as Resolution 1126 (XLI). It was the 
Representative of the Soviet Union who, while thanking 
Awad for his work, noted that:
[…] slavery was not limited exclusively to the facts men-
tioned in the report. Apartheid and certain forms of colonial 
exploitation still found in South Africa and in territories 
administered by Portugal constituted perhaps one of the 
most insidious forms of slavery with which the United 
Nations had to contend 32.
While it was the Soviet Union that first put forward 
the claim, it was the Representative of the United Republic 
of Tanzania, Waldo Waldron-Ramsey, who took the lead 
in advocating the link between slavery and apartheid and 
colonialism throughout the discussion of the Social Com-
mittee and was the intellectual engine behind the concept 
of “slavery-like practice”. For Waldron-Ramsey, one had 
to start with the definition of “slavery”. In his view:
[…] the policy of apartheid followed by South Africa in 
its own territory and in South West Africa, by the racist, 
traitorous and illegal regime in the Colony of Rhodesia 
and the colonialist methods applied by the Portuguese 
Government in the so-called Portuguese territories of 
26. S. Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century…, p. 362.
27. UN, United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, UN Doc. ST/HR/2/Rev.4, 1994, p. 77.
28. UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 960 (XXXVI), 12 July 1963.
29. See UN Economic and Social Council, Report of the Rapporteur appointed under Council Resolution 525 A (XVII), UN Doc. E/2673, 9 February 1955.
30. UN, Mohamed Awad, Report on Slavery, UN Doc. E/4168/Rev.1, 1966, p. 285. Emphasis in the original.
31. Ibid., p. 303.
32. UN Economic and Social Council, Social Committee, Summary Record of the Five Hundred and Thirty-Fourth Meeting, 6 July 1966, UN Doc. 
E/AC.7/SR.534, 13 December 1966, p. 11.
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Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea, were fla-
grant examples of slavery.
It was manifest that the methods traditionally used 
by the colonialist must be regarded as practices similar 
to slavery 33.
Waldron-Ramsey disagreed with Mohamed Awad’s 
proposal that a committee of experts be established to 
consider issues of slavery, “unless the endeavour was first 
made to widen the actual definition of slavery” 34.
The Chair of the Social Committee, seeing that a 
number of delegates wished to go beyond considering 
the Report on Slavery by putting forward specific proposals 
for dealing with slavery, called for the establishment of 
a working group to seek agreement on a draft resolu-
tion 35. When the Working Group reported back to the 
Social Committee, it was clear that agreement could not 
be reached on the contentious issues of apartheid and 
colonialism which were being equated to “practices similar 
to slavery” – that is, in line with the wording of the 1956 
Supplementary Convention. As the note accompanying 
the Draft Resolution put forward by the Working Group 
stated, the “texts on which members of the Working Group 
were not in agreement are indicated by the use of square 
brackets”. Of these, the third and seventh preambular 
paragraphs, as well as paragraph four of the Working 
Group’s Draft Resolution provided a choice between 
the phrase “slavery, the slave trade and institutions and 
practice similar to slavery” or “slavery, the slave trade and 
all institutions of apartheid and colonialism which form 
part of the practice of slavery”. Further disagreement 
was manifest in the Draft Resolution as to what further 
studies should flow from the Awad’s Report. While general 
agreement existed as to an examination of “the working of 
laws, regulations and administrative measures” adopted 
by States to give effect to the 1926 and 1956 Conventions, 
agreement was not forthcoming to allow for the study of 
“the practice of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa 
and the trust territory of South West Africa” or to “study 
the slave trade and sweated labour which [is obtained] in 
the Portuguese colonies in Africa” 36.
When the Working Group’s Draft Resolution was 
considered by the Social Committee of the Economic 
and Social Council, the Representative of Greece spoke 
to the move to develop an expanded definition of slavery 
as proposed by Waldron-Ramsey:
[…] if it was desired to widen or restrict the definition of 
slavery as given in those Conventions [read: 1926 Slavery 
and 1956 Supplementary Conventions], a new conference 
of plenipotentiaries should be convened. That was the only 
proper legal procedure and the procedure advocated by 
the Tanzanian representative in his draft resolution could 
not be adopted 37.
For his part, Waldron-Ramsey stated that the defini-
tion of slavery “should not give rise to any difficulty”. He 
then provided a definition, saying that slavery “obviously 
meant the domination of one individual or group of indi-
viduals by another”. He then continued:
What better example of slavery could be found than the 
situation at present prevailing on the African continent, 
in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of 
Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea, not to mention the 
territory of South-West Africa? Any failure to recognise 
that would clearly be a denial of the classic definition of 
slavery 38.
Waldron-Ramsey did not stop there. Clearly making 
a political, as opposed to a legal, argument, he stated that 
he was not going to fathom such “humbug” by States 
which sought to abide by the legal definition of slavery:
The Committee was not asked to go back to the 1926 or 
1956 Conventions, to which the Greek representative had 
referred, but to deal with slavery in 1966. Some delegations 
interpreted the notion of slavery in a limited technical 
sense and were endeavouring to restrict its definition to 
suit their own ends; he was not fooled by their humbug.
They drew attention to the slavery alleged to exist in 
India and Pakistan where it was supposed to result from 
traditional debtor-creditor relationships, or in the High 
Andes of Peru and Bolivia, where it was said to stem from 
landlord-tenant relationships. In point of fact there was no 
slavery either in those Asian countries or in Latin America, 
but slavery undoubtedly existed in the African counties he 
had mentioned [re: South Africa, Rhodesia, etc.].
Similarly, it had been claimed that forms of slavery 
were to be found in certain Islamic customs, particularly 
polygamy. He protested against such allegations which 
were designed purely to camouflage other motives. Forms 
of bondage similar to slavery might be said to exist in 
certain European and American countries particularly in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries where prostitution and drug 
addiction were rife, as he remembered from the time when 
he had practised as a barrister in London.
Nor could the question of racialism be excluded, for 
it was the direct corollary of slavery. In his opinion, the 
classic definition of slavery he had given should either be 
accepted or extended to include all related manifestations 
of it without exception 39.
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Following this discussion of the definition of slavery 
by the Tanzanian Representative, the Social Committee 
decided to suspend consideration of the issue of slavery 
for a day to allow States to try to gain agreement on a draft 
resolution. No such agreement was forthcoming, however, 
as a number of texts emerged which, in essence, marked 
the split within the Working Group, that is: between those 
who favoured wording that reflected the 1926 Slavery 
Convention and the 1956 Supplementary Convention and 
those which sought to include apartheid and colonialism 
within the terms of slavery 40.
Speaking in favour of maintaining the wording of the 
1926 and 1956 Conventions were the Representatives of the 
United States of America and France. The Representative 
of the United States of America stated that:
[…] it seemed to him that a number of delegations repre-
sented in the Committee had lost sight of the definition of 
which the Special Rapporteur [re: Mohamed Awad] had 
based his study; that definition was, in its turn, based on the 
definition laid down in the 1926 and 1956 Conventions. He 
agreed with the representative of Greece that any departure 
from that definition should be made only after the most 
careful consideration 41.
The French Representative was rather succinct, simply 
stating that he “continued to doubt the advisability of the 
extension of the definition of slavery” contained in the 
Draft Resolution supported by most delegations 42.
Not surprisingly, the text which would emerge at the 
Economic and Social Council was a compromise. That 
text, sponsored by Algeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Iran, Iraq, 
Morocco and the United Republic of Tanzania, did not 
seek to establish the “slavery-like practices of apartheid 
and colonialism” as a stand-alone item beside slavery and 
the slave trade, but instead sought to place this phrase 
under the umbrella of slavery and the slave trade. Thus 
the Resolution notes in the preamble that “action should 
be taken to put an end to slavery and the slave trade in all 
their practices and manifestation including the slavery-
like practices and aspects of apartheid and colonialism”. 
Likewise, in the operative part of the Draft Resolution, 
Paragraph 5 reads: “Decides to refer the question of slavery 
and the slave trade in all their practices and manifesta-
tions including the slavery-like practices of apartheid and 
colonialism, to the Commission on Human Rights” 43.
The Representative of Gabon stated that proposed draft 
resolutions which included reference “to apartheid and 
colonialism had not been made in order to introduce poli-
tics into the debate” 44; and yet, overtly this is what happened 
when the Representative of Iraq claimed that “some of the 
institutions and practices referred to in the Convention had 
disappeared following the accession to independence of 
the countries in which they had existed, and others would 
disappear as those countries acquired economic stability”. 
Little time need be spent on the possibility of debt-bondage, 
serfdom, servile marriage or child exploitation somehow 
disappeared as a result of independence, but to say that 
the claim is certainly doubtful. The Representative of Iraq 
went on to say that both apartheid and colonialism “had 
been mentioned at the 1956 Conference, but at that time not 
enough people had been prepared to press for the inclusion 
in the Convention of a reference to apartheid and colonial-
ism as being institutions and practices similar to slavery” 45. 
However, this claim is unsustainable as an examination 
of the record of the 1956 United Nations Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on a Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, shows no consideration of the 
possible inclusion of apartheid or colonialism as practices or 
institutions similar to slavery. In fact, apartheid was literally 
not mentioned at all during the Conference; and discussion 
of colonialism only emerged in a benign manner as a result 
of the inclusion at Article 12 of the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention of a “territorial” or “colonial” clause 46.
Despite such considerations the phrase “the slavery-
like practices of apartheid and colonialism” found its place 
in the lexicon of the United Nations; and considerations 
of human exploitation went from being exclusively legal 
– based on the 1926 Slavery Convention (i.e.: slavery and 
the slave trade) and the 1956 Supplementary Convention 
(i.e.: institutions and practices similar to slavery) – to 
being also considered under the rubrics of a term of art 
“slavery-like practices”.
The Report of the Social Committee on slavery was 
forwarded to the Economic and Social Council and con-
sidered on 26 July 1966; with the result that Resolution 
40. See UN Economic and Social Council, Social Committee, Slavery: Canada, Panama, Philippines and Sweden: Draft Resolution, UN Doc. E/
AC.7/L.487, 12 July 1966; UN Economic and Social Council, Social Committee, Slavery, Draft Resolution submitted by Algeria, Gabon, Iraq and the 
United Republic of Tanzania, UN Doc. E/AC.7/L.488, 12 July 1966; UN Economic and Social Council, Social Committee, Slavery, Draft Resolution 
submitted by Algeria, Gabon, Iraq and the United Republic of Tanzania, UN Doc. E/AC.7/L.488/Rev.1, 13 July 1966; and UN Economic and Social 
Council, Social Committee, Slavery, Algeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Iran, Iraq, Morocco and the United Republic of Tanzania: Draft Resolution, UN 
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1126 was adopted, declaring that “slavery in all its forms, 
the trade in persons, apartheid and colonialism should be 
eradicated” 47. The Economic and Social Committee, for its 
part, referred “the question of slavery and the slave trade in 
all their practices and manifestations including the slavery-
like practices of apartheid and colonialism, to the Commis-
sion on Human Rights” 48. The Commission, following suit, 
handed the issue over to its Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1967 with 
the mandate to “undertake regular consideration of the 
question of slavery in all its forms, including the slavery-like 
practice of apartheid and colonialism” 49. Also in 1967, in the 
context of dealing with issues of slavery as it relates to the 
Commission on the Status of Women, the Economic and 
Social Council affirmed “that the racist policies of apartheid 
and colonialism constitute slavery-like practices and should 
be eradicated completely and immediately”. However, it 
went further, stating that it recognised:
[…] that both the International Slavery Convention of 
1926 and the Supplementary Convention of 1956 on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery should be reconsidered in order 
to embrace the contemporary manifestations of slavery 
exemplified by apartheid and colonialism 50.
In 1972, the Economic and Social Council sought 
to draw attention “to the close relationship between the 
effects of slavery, apartheid and colonialism” and directed 
the Sub-Commission to “examine the possibility of the 
establishment of some form of permanent machinery to 
give advice on the elimination of slavery […]” 51. Yet by 
the time the Sub-Commission proposed a mechanism 
to deal with issues of slavery, the die had been cast with 
regard to any legal link between apartheid and slavery. 
It should be noted that from this time forward the notion 
of the slavery-like practice of colonialism never gained 
any true independent footing, instead when “slavery-like 
practice” was mention it was primarily in conjunction 
with apartheid 52.
The association of apartheid with slavery through the 
term “slavery-like practice” would fail to find legal footing. 
In fact, when States moved, in 1973, to establish a conven-
tion to suppress and punish apartheid, even in its earliest 
draft form, the proposed instrument failed to make this 
connection 53. The lack of inclusion of such a provision was 
made more evident by the fact that the original draft was 
developed in tandem between Guinea and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the latter having been the very 
same State which had put forward the original proposition 
that apartheid was an “insidious form of slavery”. The 
nearest that original draft came to making a link between 
slavery and apartheid was the crime of apartheid which was 
deemed to be “committed for the purpose of establishing 
and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons 
over any other racial group of persons and of systemati-
cally oppressing them” by, inter alia, the “[e]xploitation of 
labour of the members of an oppressed racial group” 54. That 
provision was later modified at the prompting of wording 
put forward by Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Republic 
of Tanzania, which sought to bring into the equation forced 
labour. As a result, the 1973 International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apart-
heid established, amongst the instances of the crime of 
apartheid, the following: “Exploitation of the labour of 
the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by 
submitting them to forced labour” 55.
B. Apartheid Unbridled from the Notion  
of “Slavery-like Practice”
One year later, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities recommended 
through the Commission of Human Rights, and the 
Economic and Social Council accepted, the establishment 
of a five-person Working Group on Slavery, comprised of 
members of the Sub-Commission. It was here, within the 
Working Group on Slavery (and its later incarnation as 
the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery), 
that the legal regime of slavery and human exploitation 
gave way to the political; wherein the Working Group, 
at its very first session in 1975, made plain that it was not 
going to be bound by the definition of slavery established 
by the 1926 Slavery Convention (which, it should be added, 
is reiterated and confirmed in the 1956 Supplementary 
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Convention); instead, while tentatively putting forward 
two possible broad definitions of slavery, the Working 
Group was in general agreement “that the definition should 
be flexible enough to be applicable to any new form of slav-
ery which might emerge in the future and not to limit the 
scope of investigation of all its possible manifestations” 56.
With this in mind, the Working Group did not hesitate, 
despite the silence of the newly established Apartheid Con-
vention, to equate in direct terms apartheid and slavery. 
“Apartheid”, the Working Group stated, “was considered 
as the most extended practice of slavery, since the whole 
population finds itself under the control of a few, through 
force”. With this as a starting point, some members of the 
Working Group considered that apartheid and colonial-
ism “were, in themselves, forms of slavery and, therefore 
the formulation ‘slavery-like practices of apartheid and 
colonialism’ should be replaced by the formulation ‘the 
slavery of apartheid and colonialism’”. For other members 
of the Working Group, slavery was found only in some 
features of apartheid and colonialism 57. Where the Work-
ing Group was in agreement beyond a link between slavery 
and apartheid was that there was a lack of information and 
that an in-depth study of the relationship was necessary.
In its 1976 Report, the Working Group on Slavery, 
in considering the work of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists, agreed that a number of penal sanctions 
applied to terms and conditions of employment found 
in Southern Rhodesia’s 1901 Masters and Servants Act 
were “akin to slavery” 58. The Working Group on Slavery 
continued to shift the goalposts this time determining, 
in 1977, that “apartheid could be considered a collective 
form of slavery”; it further recommendated that apartheid 
as a collective form of slavery be considered at its next 
session 59. In 1978, on the recommendation of the Working 
Group on Slavery, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities requested the 
UN Secretary-General to “carry out, as a matter of priority, 
a study of apartheid and colonialism as collective forms 
of slavery” 60. The move from the slavery-like practice to 
a “collective form of slavery” saw the further obfuscation 
of the legal with the political.
The Secretary-General, in his 1980 Apartheid as a Col-
lective Form of Slavery, sought to rectify the situation, as he 
noted that this was “the first report prepared for the United 
Nations which attempts to spell out the various elements of 
the apartheid system as a slavery-like practice” 61. In speak-
ing about apartheid, the Secretary-General acknowledged 
that a general consensus had developed within the inter-
national community that apartheid should be understood 
as “the dispossession and oppression by the white ruling 
minority of the entire black population for the purpose of 
exploiting its labour”. Flowing from this general consensus 
was an attempt to deal with the issue in legal terms:
[…] apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa are 
therefore practices similar to slavery and forced labour 
which rely increasingly on indirect compulsion exercised 
through discriminatory and repressive legislation, but 
which have developed out of, and co-exist with, historical 
forms of direct compulsion 62.
“This definition”, the UN Secretary-General writes,
[…] is clearly broader than the definitions of slavery and 
slavery-like practices [sic: it should read “institutions 
and practices similar to slavery”] and of forced labour 
contained in the Slavery Convention of 1926, the Supple-
mentary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 
1956, and the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) of 1930.
Instead, the Secretary-General notes, this wider defi-
nition “emphasizes the indirect nature of the coercion 
exercised on the black population and its historical roots 
in colonial conquest and expropriation” 63.
In essence, the Secretary-General considers the slavery-
like practices of apartheid to be exploitation through 
indirect or structural forced labour. He writes that the 
“international consensus which holds that apartheid is 
a slavery-like practice is supported by a variety of recent 
historical studies which have analysed the development 
of apartheid as a system of forced labour based on the 
dispossession and exploitation of the black people of South 
Africa” 64. As the Secretary-General notes, “apartheid as a 
slavery-like system relies in the first place on the exercise 
of control over the conditions under which African labour 
is made available to white employers” 65. Such control, the 
Secretary-General reports, includes that of residency (Afri-
cans being confined and forced to relocate to “bantustans” 
or reserved lands, and to settle in single-sex hostiles while 
providing labour in white areas), of movement (pass-cards 
attached to labour), and of labour (Africans being restricted 
to low-skilled occupations and through a “colour-bar” to 
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advancement in career). As a result of the limited land 
available for subsistence farming within the bantustans, 
and the establishment of a head-tax on each African male, 
this constructed a requirement to provide one’s labour; 
hence through structural elements of the State, collective 
forced labour was the result of the South African apartheid 
system.
The Secretary-General concludes his study by say-
ing that apartheid is “not simply a racial discrimination 
problem”, but:
[…] the essence of apartheid lies in the dispossession of 
the black population through the imposition of quasi-
colonial rule, and in the harnessing of the labour of the 
vanquished indigenous people through a variety of coercive 
measures for the profit of white investors, both South 
African and foreign. The international community has 
therefore described the apartheid system as a slavery-like 
practice imposed on an entire collectivity, which can be 
eradicated only through a complete restructuring of the 
existing political and economic relationships 66.
For the first and only time, within the United Nations 
system, the notion of the “slavery-like practice” of apartheid 
was given specific consideration. The Secretary-General 
found the link a rather tenuous one, basing himself on the 
pronouncement of what he termed the “policy-making 
organs of the United Nations” – in other words, pronounce-
ments of the United Nations’ political organs. Within these 
organs, no clear understanding of the term “slavery-like 
practice of apartheid” had emerged, instead in considering 
the various UN reports on apartheid, the Secretary-General 
sought to show that if there was a slavery-like element to 
apartheid it lay in a collective, structural, inducement of 
forced labour on racial grounds.
Having been privy to the interim Report of the 
Secretary-General in 1979, the Working Group on Slavery 
determined that the “denial of freedom of residence, 
movement and employment and the denial of the right to 
organize in order to change the situation” in South Africa 
was “the essence of apartheid as a slavery-like practice” 67.
While the Secretary-General’s Report appeared to 
right things by establishing apartheid as a slavery-like 
practice, this was undone shortly thereafter. In 1980, 
the Economic and Social Council decided to appoint 
Benjamin Whitaker, as Special Rapporteur to update 
Mohamed Awad’s 1966 Report on Slavery. Where apart-
heid was concerned, Whitaker noted that in general terms 
that “unjust economic exploitation underlies many of the 
most serious violations of human rights”. He then singled 
out apartheid, saying that “if a dominant stratum forces 
others either to work on sub-human terms or to starve, 
it may be said to be employing a slavery-like practice” 68. 
However, Whitaker once more brought into the fold 
the notion of apartheid as collective slavery by noting 
first that “apartheid is in the opinion of many people 
the most oppressive manifestation of slavery that exists 
in the world today”. The continuing:
[…] apartheid and colonialism, in many of their effects, 
are forms of collective or group slavery that fundamentally 
oppresses the human rights of several million people. A 
particular virulent evil of its immorality is that the victims 
are condemned, involuntarily, to their predicament from 
the day of their birth and without redress 69.
In its 1984 Report, the Working Group on Slavery 
combined the notions of the slavery-like practice of 
apartheid and the designation of apartheid as collec-
tive slavery by recognising awkwardly “that apartheid is 
the gravest disregard of human dignity and a collective 
slavery-like practice” 70. This was followed the next year 
by a determination by the Working Group that apartheid 
is the “most evil practice analogous to slavery, which 
constitutes a crime against humanity” 71. Despite this, the 
now newly rebranded Working Group on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery, in its 1988 Report, sought to infer that it 
was somehow being consistent in its use of terminology 
by recommending that “apartheid, including the labour 
practices under apartheid, should continue to be viewed 
as a collective form of slavery” 72. Despite this continued 
vacillation as to what nomenclature should be used to 
link slavery with apartheid, such consideration would 
become moot as events on the ground would quickly 
overtake those of the UN Human Rights system.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the start 
of the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War which in its wake led to the end of apartheid 
in South Africa. With the freeing of Nelson Mandela in 
February 1990 after twenty-seven years of imprisonment 
the road towards the new, apartheid-free South Africa 
began in earnest. For the Working Group on Contemporary 
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UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.2/434, 24 August 1979, p. 9.
68. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Updating of the Report on Slavery Submitted to the Sub-
Commission in 1966, Report of Mr. Benjamin Whitaker, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/20, 5 July 1982, p. 7.
69. Ibid., p. 11.
70. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Question of Slavery and the Slave Trade in all their Practices 
and Manifestations, including the Slavery-like Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism, Report of the Working Group on Slavery on its Tenth Session, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/25, 21 August 1984, p. 13.
71. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report of the Working Group on Slavery on its Eleventh 
Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/25, 15 August 1985, p. 11.
72. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Question of Slavery and the Slave Trade in all their Practices 
and Manifestations, including the Slavery-like Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery on its Thirteenth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/32, 22 August 1988, p. 24.
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Forms of Slavery, a new path beckoned, having been laid 
out in a recommendation to the Commission on Human 
Rights that with regard to this “item under the agenda, 
particular emphasis should be given to the situation of 
children and of women under apartheid” 73. This gave way 
to a recommendation in 1989 that “under this agenda 
item more attention should be given in future sessions to 
the situation of women and children”; that is: dropping 
the need to consider the issue as linked to apartheid 74. 
The following year this recommendation evolved further, 
speaking of “the situation of vulnerable groups, particularly 
women and children” 75. No discussions were held under 
the agenda heading of “slavery-like practices of apartheid 
and colonialism” the following year. Despite the fact that 
the Working Group put forward a recommendation in 
1992 to “devote greater attention to ways and means of 
assisting the victims of apartheid in order to mitigate its 
consequences” 76, the line item of the “slavery-like prac-
tices of apartheid and colonialism” was removed from the 
agenda of the Working Group in 1993.
C. “Slavery-like Practice”  
Unbridled from Apartheid
While apartheid came to be unbridled from the notion 
of “slavery-like practice” as being, for instance “akin to 
slavery”, or “collective form of slavery”, etc., the very 
term “slavery-like practice” also gained an independent 
existence from its association to apartheid.
This decoupling of “slavery-like practice” from 
apartheid and its attachment to other types of human 
exploitation first transpire in the 1982 Report by Benjamin 
Whitaker in which he introduced new “slavery-like prac-
tices” for consideration. Under the heading of “slavery-
like practices involving women”, Whitaker examined 
involuntary marriage and abortion, trafficking in women, 
exploitation of prostitution, women under apartheid, 
genital mutilation, sale of women and killing for rea-
sons of dowry. Having extended the term of art beyond 
its original link to apartheid, the Report confuses the 
political with the legal, including with types of slavery-like 
practices that of servile marriage (ie: in Whitaker’s words 
“involuntary marriage”) which it covers as an institution 
or practice similar to slavery found at Article 1(c) of the 
Supplementary Convention; and the sale of women which 
would fall within the definition of slavery as set out in the 
1926 Slavery Convention.
In 1989, the Working Group on Contemporary Forms 
of Slavery, sensing that the term “slavery-like practice” 
and its association with apartheid was to become obsolete, 
appropriated the term as an agenda item. Rather incredibly 
it substituted the term “slavery-like practice” for that of 
“institutions and practices of slavery” as established by 
the 1956 Supplementary Convention. Under line item 3 
of its 1989 Report, the Working Group maintained a 
heading for five years which read: “Review of Informa-
tion Received on the Status and the Implementation of 
Conventions on Slavery and Slavery-like Practices” 77. 
This was a monumental shift, as from the first substantive 
agenda set in 1977 until 1988, the Working Group had an 
agenda item under the heading of “Review of Develop-
ments in the Field of Slavery and the Slave Trade in all their 
Practices and Manifestations”. This however gave way as 
the newly renamed Working Group on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery, which sought to make the distinction 
between the legal – by providing a line-item on “slavery 
and slavery-like practices” meant to consider the 1926 and 
1956 Conventions – and a new line-item which included 
a more encompassing “Review of Developments in other 
Fields of Contemporary Forms of Slavery”. This category 
would come to consider, over time: trafficking in persons, 
exploitation of prostitutes (in 1989); child pornography, 
children in armed conflict (1990); child soldiers (1991); 
removal of organs (1992); incest (1993); migrant workers, 
sex tourism (1994); illegal adoption (1996); early marriages, 
detained juveniles (1997).
In 2000, David Weissbrodt of the Sub-Commission 
and the NGO Anti-Slavery International updated the 
Awad and Whitaker reports. The 2000 Working Paper 
also conflated, as the Working Group on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery had done before it, the term of law “insti-
tutions and practices similar to slavery” and the term of 
art “slavery-like practice”. The Weissbrodt – Anti-Slavery 
73. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Question of Slavery and the Slave Trade in all their Practices 
and Manifestations, including the Slavery-like Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery on its Thirteenth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/32, 22 August 1988, p. 24.
74. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Question of Slavery and the Slave Trade in all their Practices 
and Manifestations, including the Slavery-like Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery on its Fourteenth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/39, 28 August 1989, p. 29.
75. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Report of the Working 
Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Fifteenth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/44, 23 August 1990, p. 23.
76. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Report of the Working 
Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Seventeenth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/34, 23 June 1992, p. 26. Note also limited 
discussion in UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Updated Review of the 
Implementation of and Follow-up to the Conventions on Slavery, p. 22.
77. See UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Question of Slavery and the Slave Trade in all their 
Practices and Manifestations, including the Slavery-like Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery on its Fourteenth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/39, 28 August 1989, p. 1.
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International Working Paper stated that “ownership is the 
common theme existing in all of the conventions concern-
ing the abolition of slavery and slavery-like practices” 78. 
As such, the 2000 Working Paper gave “slavery-like 
practice” an independent meaning from that of apartheid 
and muddied the waters further by substituting it for the 
term of law “institutions and practices similar to slavery” 
as set out in the 1956 Supplementary Conventions.
Here then we see the manner in which a failed attempt 
in 1966 to have apartheid and colonialism equated to 
slavery created a new term of art: “slavery-like practice”. 
That term, over time, not only lost its meaning but its com-
ponent parts were detached from each other. Apartheid 
was no longer a slavery-like practice, it became a collective 
form of slavery among other variations on the theme. 
Likewise “slavery-like practices” having been decoupled 
from apartheid came to be conflated with the legal term 
“institutions and practice similar to slavery”. As a result of 
the varied and continued loose use of terminology within 
the United Nations system, the legal terms – “slavery” and 
“institutions and practices similar to slavery” – lost their 
meaning, obfuscated within a UN Charter-based human 
rights regime which is, to its very core, political.
III. 1998-present –  
International Criminal Law
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the international 
legal regime regarding slavery and human exploitation 
excised for all intents and purposes in name only. The 
1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention had been surpassed by the UN Charter-based 
regime’s conflation of “slavery-like practice” with “slav-
ery” and “institutions and practices similar to slavery” 
so as to render these latter two terms virtually without 
meaning. That said, the apparent diminution of the legal 
regime governing slavery and human exploitation has 
had a reprieve, having been given a new life by the move 
which manifests itself in the twenty-first century through 
international criminal law. While the twentieth century 
saw but one international judgment focused on slavery 
and human exploitation – the 1905 Muscat Dhows case, 
the twenty-first century has thus far seen decisions by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(2002 Kunarac et als. case), the European Court of Human 
Rights (2005 Siliadin case), the Economic Community of 
West African States Community Court of Justice (2008 
Mani v Niger case); and a consideration by the High Court 
of Australia of the definition of slavery in international 
law (2008 The Queen v Tang). This newfound interest in 
issues of slavery and human exploitation results from 
recent international agreements which seek to deal with 
these issues from the perspective of criminal law – with 
a focus on those who would enslave – as opposed to the 
human rights regime and its focus on the victim of a 
human rights abuse.
A. The Trafficking Instruments
This renascence of legal issues surrounding slavery and 
human exploitation was given impetus through the 2000 
Palermo Protocol to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime. That instrument, 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, especially Women and Children, sets out a 
definition of “trafficking in persons” wherein various 
types of human exploitation are noted. It might be added 
here that the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings sets out, 
in the exact same terms, its definition for “trafficking in 
human beings” as:
[…] the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force 
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of decep-
tion, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour 
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude 
or the removal of organs 79.
In essence, the trafficking conventions do not seek to 
suppress human exploitation per se as the conventions deal 
with the crime of trafficking for the purposes of exploitation, 
the crime being the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons” not, for instance, the 
actual enslavement of a person. What these conventions 
do, however, is for the most part give voice to the various 
types of human exploitation which have international 
instruments attached to them and bring them together 
for the first time 80. In a somewhat convoluted manner, the 
conventions enumerate the most serious types of exploita-
tion as being “at minimum” what constitutes exploitation. 
This allows for the possibility of lesser or differing types 
of exploitation to also fall under the definitional element 
78. UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Updated Review of the Implementation 
of and Follow-up to the Conventions on Slavery, p. 7. See also paragraph 62 at p. 15 for the same type of conflation.
79. UN, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, 2000, Article 3(a); and Council of Europe, 
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 16.V.2005, Article 4(a). Emphasis added.
80. See 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others; 1930 Forced Labour 
Convention (ILO No. 29); 1926 Slavery Convention; 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery; 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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of exploitation, forming part of what, in law, constitutes 
“trafficking in persons”.
The Palermo Protocol is transnational in nature, much 
like the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supple-
mentary Convention, it does not create an international 
regime, but a transnational one requiring each State Party 
to act within its jurisdiction. The Protocol requires States 
to criminalise the conduct established by the definition of 
trafficking in persons, that is, participating, acting as an 
accomplice, organising or directing others to trafficking, 
as well as, where the legal system permits, attempting to 
commit 81. The Protocol further sets out ways in which 
States Parties are meant to cooperate with each other 
while requiring each State to strengthen its respective 
border controls.
The importance of the trafficking conventions to the 
regime of slavery and human exploitation is found in the 
fact that these confirm the relevance of the definitions of 
slavery and institutions and practices similar to slavery 
as set out in the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery. The travaux préparatoires of both the Palermo 
Protocol and the Council of Europe convention indicate 
that the diplomats negotiating those instruments had 
the definitions of slavery as set out in the 1926 Slavery 
Convention and that of institutions and practices similar 
to slavery as set out in the 1956 Supplementary Convention 
in mind when they included these terms in the trafficking 
conventions 82.
B. Enslavement  
and the International Criminal Court
If anything, the legacy for international relations of the 
short Post-Cold War era – that period between the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the attacks of 11 September 
2001 – is the actualisation of a regime of international 
criminal law. The establishment in 1993 and 1994 of the 
ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
for Rwanda followed by hybrid courts and the ultimate 
negotiation in Rome of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court in 1998 mean that the twenty-first century 
is endowed with a system of international criminal justice 
which may prosecute “the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole” 83.
Amongst these international crimes is the crime 
against humanity of enslavement and the crime against 
humanity and war crime of sexual slavery 84. As the UN 
Special Rapporteur, Gay McDougall noted with regard to 
“sexual slavery”, in her Report on Systematic Rape, Sexual 
Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict, 
the “term ‘sexual’ is […] an adjective to describe a form 
of slavery, not to denote a separate crime. In all respects 
and in all circumstances, sexual slavery is slavery” 85. While 
this acknowledgement that sexual slavery describes a 
type of slavery, the same could not be said to be true, 
until recently, with regard to the term “enslavement”. 
Before the coming into existence of the 1998 Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, the legacy of the 
Nuremburg trials was such that the International Law 
Commission considered that:
Enslavement means establishing or maintaining over per-
sons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour contrary 
to well-established and widely recognized standards of 
international law, such as: the Slavery Convention (slavery); 
the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery (slavery and servitude); the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (slavery and servitude); and 
ILO Convention No. 29, concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour (forced labour). Enslavement was included as a 
crime against humanity in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal (art. 6, subpara. (c)), Control Council Law No. 10 
(art. II, subpara. (c)), the statute of the International Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (art. 5) and the statute of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda (art. 3) as well as 
the Nürnberg Principles (Principle VI) and the 1954 draft 
Code (art. 2, para. 11) 86.
This understanding, that enslavement included not 
only slavery but also servitude and forced labour, was 
acknowledged by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia in the Kunarac et als. case, 
where the Trial Chamber determined that the definition 
of enslavement “may be broader than the traditional and 
sometimes apparently distinct definitions of slavery, the 
slave trade and servitude or forced or compulsory labour 
found in other areas of international law” 87.
Despite the fact that the law developed by the Inter-
national Law Commission and the International Criminal 
81. See UN, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, 2000, Article 5.
82. See UN, Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiations for the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
and the Protocols thereto, United Nations Publication Sales No. E.06.V.5, 2006; and Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings and its Explanatory Report, 16.V.2005.
83. Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, Article 5.
84. Ibid., Article 7(1)(c) – Crime against humanity of enslavement; Article 7(1)(g) – Crime against humanity of sexual slavery; Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) 
– War crime of sexual slavery (international conflict); and Article 8(2)(e)(vi) – War crime of sexual slavery (non-international armed conflict).
85. UN Commission on Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed 
Conflict, Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998, § 30.
86. UN General Assembly, International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996, vol. 2, part 2, Article 18, p. 47. Emphasis added.
87. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Kunarac et als., 22 February 2001, case nº IT-96-23-T &-IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, p. 193.
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia seems to indicate that 
customary international law considered “enslavement” 
to be distinct from “slavery”, as being an umbrella term 
which included not only slavery, but also lesser servitudes 
including forced labour, this understanding has not found 
its way into the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Instead, the Statute defines enslavement as being 
synonymous with slavery, that is:
“Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person 
and includes the exercise of such power in the course of 
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children 88.
Synonymous, as the first part of the definition of 
enslavement mirrors the definition of slavery established 
by the 1926 Slavery Convention; while the second part (ie: 
“and includes the exercise of such power in the course 
of trafficking in persons, in particular women and chil-
dren”) does not extend the definition nor modify it, but 
simply highlights the fact that enslavement within cases 
of trafficking also fall within the purview of this provi-
sion 89. Thus, on the basis of a treaty, the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court narrows “enslavement” so 
as to be, in law, “slavery”; while discarding the perceived 
customary international law established to date.
That said, it should be acknowledged that the second-
ary legislation of the International Criminal Court, its 
Elements of Crimes, which are meant to assist “the Court 
in the interpretation and application” of these crimes, 
does ultimately mention lesser servitudes 90. However, the 
mention of forced labour and lesser servitudes within the 
Elements of Crimes does not – as will be demonstrated – 
expand the definition of enslavement beyond that of 
“slavery”. This is so as Article 9(3) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court requires that the “Elements 
of Crimes […] be consistent with this Statute”.
Turning to the provisions of the Elements of Crimes 
of the crime of enslavement, Element 1 reads:
The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as 
by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person 
or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation 
of liberty.
At the end of this Element is the footnote which states:
It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in 
some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or 
otherwise reducing a person to servile status as defined 
in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the 
conduct described in this element includes trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children 91.
Prima facie, one might say, via the footnote to Ele-
ment 1 of the Crime against humanity of enslavement that 
forced labour and the institutions and practices similar to 
slavery established by the 1956 Supplementary Convention 
fall within the definition of enslavement and thus expand 
that notion beyond slavery to include lesser servitudes. 
This, however, cannot be as the Elements of Crimes must 
be consistent with the Statute which set the definition of 
enslavement as mirroring that of slavery as first established 
by the 1926 Slavery Convention. The manner in which 
the footnote to Element 1 can be reconciled so as to be 
consistent with the Statute is to be found through the clause 
which states that the “deprivation of liberty may, in some 
circumstances, include” the exacting of forced labour or 
the reduction of a person via the institutions and practices 
similar to slavery. Those circumstances would have to be 
when forced labour or debt bondage, serfdom, servile 
marriage or child exploitation (i.e.: the institutions and 
practices similar to slavery) manifest powers attaching to 
the right of slavery and thus slip their definitional moorings 
to become also – in law – slavery and, as a result, also meet 
the definition of enslavement as established by the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.
The possibility that forced labour and the institu-
tions and practices similar to slavery can also manifest 
powers attaching to the right of ownership and thus be 
considered as slavery as well (and enslavement via the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court) is foreseen in 
international law. Article 5 of the 1926 Slavery Convention 
calls on States Parties to take “all necessary measures to 
prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into 
conditions analogous to slavery” 92. In other words, there 
was a recognition as far back as 1926 that forced labour 
could degenerate into slavery; that is: forced labour could 
manifest “powers attaching to the right of ownership”. 
Likewise, where the institutions and practices similar to 
slavery as set out in the 1956 Supplementary Convention 
are concerned, that instrument expresses in clear terms 
that these institutions and practices may also constitute 
slavery as defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention. Article 1 
of the Supplementary Convention, while setting out the 
88. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, Article 7(2)(c).
89. See Katanga and Chui case, International Criminal Court, Amicus Curiae on Observations related to Sexual Slavery submitted by Queen’s University 
Belfast Human Rights Centre, ICC-01/04-01/07-1257-Anx, 30 June 2009, § 24. Note that the High Court of Australia has stated that such a formulation 
as the latter part of the definition of enslavement is “a common drafting technique”: The Queen v Tang [2008], HCA 39, 28 August 2008, § 33.
90. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 9(3).
91. Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(c), Crime against humanity of enslavement, Element 1, ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B), 9 September 2002. Note that 
Element 1 of the Crime against humanity of enslavement is reproduced verbatim, including the footnote, as Element 1 common to the Crimes 
of sexual slavery. See Article 7(1)(g)-2 – Crime against humanity of sexual slavery; Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 – War crime of sexual slavery; and 
Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-2 – War crime of sexual slavery and the corresponding footnotes 18, 53, and 65.
92. League of Nations, Slavery Convention, Article 5.
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four types of servile status (i.e.: debt bondage, serfdom, 
servile marriage or child exploitation), provides in its 
introductory paragraph that States Parties “shall take all 
practicable and necessary legislative and other measures 
to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the 
complete abolition or abandonment of [these] institu-
tions and practices”. The introductory paragraph then 
continues, stating that the abolition or abandonment of 
these institutions and practices should take place “where 
they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the 
definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery 
Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926” 93.
The Elements of Crimes are meant to both assist the 
Court in “the interpretation and application” of the Statute 
and be consistent with that Statute 94. By acknowledging 
that the lesser servitudes noted in the footnote can, in 
some circumstances, manifest powers attaching to the right 
of ownership, means that forced labour and institutions 
and practices similar to slavery can manifest the elements 
required to constitute the crime against humanity of ens-
lavement as set out in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.
Conclusion
The advent of the trafficking conventions and the com-
ing into existence of the International Criminal Court in 
2002 provide a reprieve for the legal regime of slavery and 
human exploitation which had lost its way as a result of 
the introduction of the term of art “slavery-like practice” 
during the latter half of the twentieth century. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, through the height of 
the colonial era, States within the early years of both the 
League of Nations and the United Nations established a 
legal regime governing both slavery and servitude manifest 
in the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. With the 
balance of power shifting in the United Nations from 1966 
onwards, newly independent States sought – and ultimately 
failed – to have apartheid recognised as a “practice similar 
to slavery”. Instead a diplomatic compromise was achieved 
which labelled apartheid with a term of art, that of “slavery 
like-practice”. This term ultimately allows for the evolution 
of the notion of “contemporary forms of slavery” to emerge 
from the United Nations as an umbrella term utilised to 
define various social ills. Referral back to the legal only 
took place at the start of the twenty-first century, with 
the establishment of a definition of trafficking in human 
beings and the coming into force of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court which established the crime 
against humanity of enslavement. In reverting back to the 
legal, within a paradigm of criminal law, the law governing 
slavery appears to have been given a true lease on life as it 
has become a viable instrument for holding perpetrators 
accountable for enslavement and thus offering protection 
of those enslaved.
93. United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery, Final Act and Supplementary Convention. Emphasis added.
94. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 9(1) and 9(3).
